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Propoor public spending on healthcare and other services is a stated objective
of national governments and international agencies. It is central to the mission
of the World Bank and is a key component of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative and the International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility. Motivations include redressing inequity in the distribution
of healthcare, reducing health inequality, and raising the human capital of the
poor and thereby the growth potential of the economy. In low-income
countries, where administrative constraints on redistribution through cash
transfers are particularly binding, a subsidiary justification for public spending
on healthcare may be the alleviation of poverty and the reduction of inequality
(Besley and Coate 1991). The validity of these arguments for public spending
on healthcare rests on the empirical question of whether the spending is in fact
targeted to the poor.
Benefit incidence analysis identifies the recipients of public spending in
relation to their position in the income distribution. Benefit incidence studies,
many conducted by the World Bank, generally find that public spending on
healthcare in developing countries is not concentrated on the poor (van de
Walle 1995; Castro-Leal and others 2000; Mahal and others 2000; Sahn and
Younger 2000; Filmer 2003). Most of these studies have been conducted on an
ad hoc basis, with relatively little attention to consistency in methods.
Limitations in the comparability of the evidence make it difficult to draw
lessons about the economic, political, and health system characteristics that
explain greater and lesser success in targeting health spending to the poor.
This article presents comparable evidence on the incidence of public health
spending using consistent methods across eight Asian countries (Bangladesh,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam) and
three Chinese provinces or regions (Gansu, Heilongjiang, and Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region). Dominance tests are used to determine
whether the distribution of public healthcare deviates significantly from perfect
equality. Many indicators show that poorer individuals are generally less
healthy (Gwatkin and others 2003) and, one may presume, in greater need of
healthcare. From an egalitarian perspective an equitable distribution of health-
care demands that resources be concentrated on the poor. Evidence that the
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poor do not receive their population share of health spending would be suffi-
cient to reject equity in the allocation of public healthcare. While the main jus-
tification for public provision of healthcare is likely to be its impact on the
level and distribution of population health, redistribution of living standards
may be a further motivation in largely informal economies that are constrained
in the execution of tax and cash transfer policies.1 To assess the redistributive
impact of public health spending, its distribution is compared with the Lorenz
curve of household income.
One limitation of many previous benefit incidence studies is the crudeness of
the unit cost data used to value services (van de Walle 1998; Sahn and
Younger 2000). This study derives costs from detailed health accounts, avail-
able for most of the countries and provinces, which document public expendi-
tures across health services, facilities, and regions. This allows examination of
whether conclusions about the incidence of public healthcare are sensitive to
analysis of use or expenditure data.
Data and methods are described in the next section and results are presented
and discussed in section II. The findings are summarized in section III.
I . D A T A A N D M E T H O D S
The objective is to estimate and assess the distribution of public healthcare in
relation to economic status. For each country data are from recent health or
socioeconomic surveys that provide information on both use of public health-
care and a suitable measure of living standards (see table S-1 in the supplemen-
tal appendix, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). All are nationally
representative except for the surveys of Chinese provinces. The preferred proxy
for living standards is household (per adult equivalent) consumption, which
includes the value of goods produced by the household for its own consump-
tion and a use-value of housing and durable goods.2 Household expenditure,
rather than consumption, is used for Hong Kong SAR, where household
production is much less significant. For Malaysia the only available measure of
living standards included in the health survey is household income, which is
likely to understate the living standards of rural households. It is, however, the
measure that has been used in previous incidence studies of Malaysia
(Meerman 1979; Hammer, Nabi, and Cercone 1995).
Distributions of three categories of public healthcare—hospital inpatient
care, hospital outpatient care, and nonhospital care—are examined.
1. In Latin America cash transfers are increasingly used to affect the distribution of income, as well
as that of health and education services, but this is less so in the low-income economies of Asia, where
in-kind transfers, such as healthcare, continue to predominate.
2. The equivalence scale used is eh ¼ (Ah þ 0.5Kh)0.75, where Ah is the number of adults in
household h, and Kh is the number of children 0–14 years old. Parameter values were set on the basis
of estimates summarized in Deaton (1997, pp. 241–70).
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Nonhospital care is an aggregate of visits to doctors, polyclinics, health
centers, and antenatal care (table S-2). For inpatient care the recall period is 12
months, except in Bangladesh (3 months) and Sri Lanka (2 weeks). For all
other care the recall period is generally 2 weeks to 1 month, except in
Bangladesh where it is 3 months.
Use data do not capture variations in the quality of services received across
facilities and geographic locations. This is a potentially important deficiency
given evidence of marked quality differences favoring richer neighborhoods
even within a single city, such as Delhi, India (Das and Hammer 2005). The
service-specific non-negative public subsidy received by an individual can be
defined as:
Ski ¼ maxð0; qkickj  fkiÞð1Þ
where qki is the quantity of service k used by individual i, ckj is the unit cost of
providing k in region j where i resides, and fki is the amount paid for k by i.
Where possible, variations in costs by facility (local, district, teaching hospital)
and service (inpatient/outpatient) are taken into account. Unit costs are com-
puted as:
ckj ¼
TREkjP
i[j
qkiwi
ð2Þ
where TREkj is total recurrent public expenditure and wi is an expansion factor
that inflates sample use to population use. The total public subsidy received by
an individual is computed as Si ¼
P
k akSki, where the ak terms are scaling
factors that standardize use recall periods across services.
National health accounts, available for Bangladesh, the Chinese provinces,
Hong Kong SAR, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, are used to disaggregate expenditure
figures by facility, service, and region. Full accounts are not available for India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Vietnam. For India unit subsidies computed for
another benefit incidence study are used (Mahal and others 2000). These are
specific to 960 subgroups (three facilities, 16 major states, urban–rural
residence, gender, and five income quintiles). For Indonesia public health expen-
diture review figures allow expenditures to be disaggregated for each of 30
provinces. For Malaysia expenditure data were disaggregated to five levels of
public hospital care, but geographic disaggregation was not undertaken since the
use data could not be analyzed by this dimension. Incomplete health accounts
for Nepal allow disaggregation by hospital and nonhospital care by region. For
Vietnam public accounts and hospital costing estimates were used to compute
unit costs by service and facility but not by region (World Bank 2001).
Subtraction of the user payment from equation (1) to get the net benefit of
the service is appropriate provided that quality is not responsive to the
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payment. This is an untestable assumption with the available data. For China,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka either the survey data do not
contain information on payments made by individuals for public health ser-
vices or the data are not considered sufficiently reliable, for example, because
payments for public and other care are likely to be confused. For these
countries it is assumed that all users in a particular region pay the same
charge for a given service. Waiting and travel time also reduce the net benefit
from care and should, in principle, be valued and subtracted in computing the
subsidy. The survey data do not permit this, however. As a consequence,
benefits to the rural poor, in particular, may be overstated to the extent
that they travel long distances to access better quality care. By contrast, the
cost of waiting time will be less for the poor if time is valued according to
wage rates.
The incidence of public healthcare is described by its concentration curve,
which plots the cumulative proportion of healthcare use and subsidy against
the cumulative proportion of the population ranked by household consumption
per adult equivalent. To establish whether the subsidy is propoor, in the sense
that lower income individuals receive more of the subsidy than the better-off, a
test is conducted of whether the concentration curve dominates (lies above) the
458 line. Whether the poorest 20 percent of individuals consume more than 20
percent of healthcare is also tested. Dominance of the concentration curve over
the Lorenz curve of household consumption is tested to establish whether
spending on public healthcare reduces inequality.
For the dominance tests standard errors of the ordinates of curves and of
differences in ordinates are computed, allowing for dependence between curves
where appropriate (Bishop, Chow, and Formby 1994; Davidson and Duclos
1997).3 A multiple comparison approach to testing is adopted (Beach and
Richmond 1985; Bishop, Formby, and Thistle 1992), with the null defined as
curves being indistinguishable. This is tested against both dominance and cross-
ing of curves (Dardanoni and Forcina 1999). The null is rejected in favor of
dominance if there is at least one significant difference between the ordinates
of two curves in one direction and no significant difference in the other direc-
tion across 19 evenly spaced quantile points from 0.05 to 0.95. The null is
rejected in favor of crossing if there is at least one significant difference in each
direction. The 5 percent level of significance is used with critical values from
the studentized maximum modulus distribution to allow for the joint nature of
the test (Beach and Richmond 1985).4
An alternative dominance test consistent with the intersection–union prin-
ciple (Kaur, Rao, and Singh 1994; Howes 1996), which has been used in the
3. The computation is carried out in Stata.
4. Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) show that the probability that this test will falsely reject the null
in favor of dominance does not exceed the significance level and report Monte Carlo evidence
suggesting that the actual significance level is well below its nominal value.
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benefit incidence literature (Sahn and Younger 2000; Sahn, Younger, and
Simler 2000), takes nondominance as the null and tests this against the alterna-
tive of strict dominance. This is a conservative test that requires statistically
significant differences in ordinates at all points of comparison for the null to be
rejected. Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) present Monte Carlo evidence showing
that while this test reduces the probability of falsely rejecting nondominance to
a negligible value, compared with the multiple comparison approach it has
greatly reduced power of detecting dominance when true. Given these results,
most weight in the discussion below is given to the results from the multiple
comparison tests, but discrepancies with the more conservative intersection–
union test are pointed out.
I I . R E S U L T S
In Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, and Thailand the concentration curve of the
total public health subsidy dominates both the Lorenz curve and the 458 line of
equality (table 1, final column), indicating that the subsidy is both
inequality-reducing and propoor. With the exception of the comparison with
the 458 line in the case of Thailand, these dominance results are robust to use
of the stricter test. In Sri Lanka an equal distribution of the total subsidy is not
rejected. In relative terms this shifts the distribution of living standards toward
the poor, as the concentration curve dominates the Lorenz curve. In the
remaining countries and provinces the concentration curve of the total subsidy
is dominated by the 458 line but, with the exceptions of India and Nepal, dom-
inates the Lorenz curve. That is, the subsidy is prorich but inequality reducing.
For Bangladesh and the two Chinese provinces nondominance relative to both
the Lorenz curve and the 458 line cannot be rejected when the more conserva-
tive intersection–union test is employed.5
The degree to which the public health subsidy is targeted to the poor can be
seen more explicitly by examining the share of the subsidy received by the
poorest 20 percent of individuals (table 2). Public healthcare is clearly most
propoor in Hong Kong SAR, with the poorest fifth of the population receiving
almost two-fifths of the total subsidy (table 2, final column). In Malaysia the
poorest quintile also receives significantly more than 20 percent of the total
subsidy, but the propoor bias is much less than it is in Hong Kong SAR. In Sri
Lanka and Thailand the poorest quintile’s share of the total subsidy does not
differ significantly from 20 percent. In the remainder of countries and pro-
vinces, with the exception of Bangladesh, the poorest 20 percent of individuals
receive significantly less than 20 percent of the public health subsidy. The share
going to the poorest 20 percent of individuals is lowest in Nepal, at less than 7
percent, followed by the two Chinese provinces, at 8–10 percent. In these
5. Concentration and Kakwani indices, which provide summary measures of the magnitude by
which the concentration curve deviates from the 458 line and the Lorenz curve, are given in table S-3.
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TA B L E 1. Tests of Dominance of Concentration Curves for Public Health Service Use and Subsidy against the Lorenz Curve
and the 45 Degree Line of Equality
Country, province, or region
Use Subsidy
Hospital
inpatient
Hospital
outpatient Nonhospital
Hospital
inpatient
Hospital
outpatient Nonhospital Total
Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458 Lorenz 458
Bangladesh 2 þ 2 þ þ 2 þ þ –
Gansu, China þ 2* þ* 2 n.a. n.a. þ 2 þ 2 n.a. n.a. þ 2
Heilongjiang, China 2* þ* 2 n.a. n.a. þ 2 þ 2 n.a. n.a. þ 2
Hong Kong SAR þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ* þ*
India 2* þ* 2* þ* þ 2* þ* þ* þ* 2*
Indonesia 2 2* x 2* þ* þ 2* 2* 2 2* þ* þ þ* 2*
Malaysia þ* þ þ* þ* þ* þ* þ þ* þ* þ* þ* þ*
Nepala þ 2* n.a. n.a. þ* 2 2* n.a. n.a. x 2* x 2*
Sri Lanka þ* þ* þ þ* þ* þ* n.a. n.a. þ*
Thailand þ* þ* x þ* þ* þ* þ* þ þ* þ* þ* þ
Vietnam þ 2* 2* þ* þ þ* 2 þ 2* þ* þ þ* 2
Blank cell indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable using the multiple comparison test (Bishop, Formby, and
Thistle 1992) at the 5 percent significance level.
x indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable in favor of curves crossing using the same test.
þ /2 indicates rejection of the same null hypothesis in favor of dominance using the same test. Aþ indicates that healthcare is more concentrated on
the poor than is household consumption per adult (Lorenz) or equal per capita distribution (458), while a – indicates that it is less concentrated.
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of nondominance in favor of an alternative of strict dominance using the intersection–union test (Howes
1996) and a 5 percent significance level. Dominance is in the direction indicated by theþ or –, as above.
n.a. means that data were not available to conduct the test.
aThe results in the hospital inpatient columns refer to both inpatient and outpatient.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data documented in table S.1 (see supplemental appendix available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/).
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TA B L E 2. Share of Total Household Consumption and Public Healthcare Subsidy Received by Poorest Quintile
of Individuals (percent)
Country, province,
or region
Household consumption
per adult equivalent
Hospital care
Nonhospital care Total subsidyInpatient Outpatient
Bangladesh 7.25* (0.0437) 15.20 (6.3732) 11.60* (1.8853) 24.42 (5.5695) 16.78 (3.4916)
Gansu, Chinaa 5.24* (0.0695) 7.27* (1.5331) 9.57* (1.6473) n.a. 8.17* (1.2265)
Heilongjiang, Chinaa 5.98* (0.0759) 6.57* (1.8184) 12.32* (2.5677) n.a. 10.47* (1.8729)
Hong Kong SAR 6.82* (0.0377) 38.77* (3.2580) 38.68* (2.2048) 38.19* (1.7718) 38.73* (2.7463)
India 10.50* (0.0083) 10.70* (1.1086) 18.59 (1.6219) 26.23* (1.5471) 12.49* (0.9553)
Indonesia 9.77* (0.0078) 3.80* (0.3762) 5.77* (0.4857) 19.73 (0.3199) 13.46* (0.2582)
Malaysia 7.20* (0.0370) 21.19 (0.8807) 18.72 (1.1208) 32.25* (1.3422) 22.95* (0.6921)
Nepalb 8.05* (0.0534) 3.52* (1.4851) 3.52* (1.4851) 9.04* (1.7220) 6.64* (1.1780)
Sri Lankac 8.31* (0.0725) 20.76 (2.6013) 21.11 (1.9418) n.a. 20.88 (1.8367)
Thailand 6.94* (0.0589) 21.26 (1.4144) 17.70* (1.0278) 31.16* (1.9137) 20.06 (0.8963)
Vietnam 8.78* (0.0429) 13.64* (1.9209) 11.55* (1.7049) 19.73 (1.7346) 14.79* (1.5416)
*Significantly different from 20 percent at the 5 percent significance level. Bold indicates that the subsidy share is significantly different from the
household consumption share.
n.a. means that data were not available to conduct the test.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
aThere are no data on nonhospital care, but low-level hospitals, equivalent to polyclinics and health centers, are included.
bIt is not possible to distinguish between hospital inpatient and outpatient visits.
cThe subsidy specific to nonhospital care cannot be computed.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data documented in table S.1 (see supplemental appendix available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/).
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cases, and in Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia, the richest quintile receives
more than 30 percent of the total subsidy (not shown in table). In all cases but
Nepal the share of the subsidy going to the poorest quintile is significantly
greater than its share of total household consumption.
Differences in Incidence across Health Services
Only in Hong Kong SAR does the concentration curve dominate the 458 line
for both hospital inpatient and outpatient care and for nonhospital care (see
table 1), with the poorest quintile receiving about 39 percent of the subsidy to
all three services (see table 2). In Malaysia the concentration curves for inpati-
ent and nonhospital care lie above the 458 line, but the outpatient care curve
does not deviate significantly from the line of equality (see table 1). In
Thailand it is inpatient care that is equally distributed, while the concentration
curves for the other types of care dominate the diagonal, at least using the less
stringent test criteria. However, in both Malaysia and Thailand the poorest
quintile receives significantly more than 20 percent of the subsidy only for non-
hospital care (see table 2). In Sri Lanka there is equality in the distributions of
all services except for a propoor distribution of outpatient care as measured by
use (see table 1). In the remainder of countries and provinces, concentration
curves for hospital care tend to lie below the diagonal—meaning that the
better-off consume more—while the curves for nonhospital care lie above it.
The poorest quintile fairly consistently receives less than 20 percent of the
subsidy for hospital care and significantly more than 20 percent of the subsidy
for nonhospital care only in India (see table 2).
For most countries and provinces the distribution of nonhospital care domi-
nates that of hospital inpatient and outpatient care (table 3), confirming that
nonhospital care is generally more targeted to the poor than is hospital care.
Comparison of Use and Subsidy Distributions
Estimating the incidence of the public healthcare subsidy requires much more
information than that of raw use. Unit costs must be estimated at the facility
and regional levels and, where appropriate and possible, fees paid by individ-
uals must be identified. The effort involved to obtain this extra information is
worthwhile only if there is significant variation in unit costs or fees with the
indicator of household living standards and if this covariance is sufficiently
large relative to that for use. The dominance tests reported in table 1 display a
considerable consistency across the use and subsidy measures. Only in 10 of 58
pairwise comparisons do the conclusions of the test differ depending on
whether the distribution of use or the subsidy is examined. This is not an
insubstantial degree of disagreement, but it suggests that the results of domi-
nance tests are generally robust to the measure over which incidence is exami-
ned and that variation in use, not unit subsidies, is the main driver of the
public subsidy distribution. This increases the confidence that can be placed in
studies that look only at use. It is consistent with the findings of Sahn and
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TA B L E 3. Tests of Dominance between Concentration Curves for Different Public Health Services and between Use and
Subsidy Distributions
Country, province,
or region
Use Use and subsidy
Hospital inpatient
versus outpatient
Hospital inpatient
versus nonhospital
Hospital outpatient
versus nonhospital
Hospital
inpatient
Hospital
outpatient Nonhospital
Bangladesh op.ip
Gansu, China op.ip* n.a. n.a. use.subsidy n.a.
Heilongjiang, China op.ip n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hong Kong SAR use.subsidy
India op.ip* non-h.ip* non-h.op* subsidy.use subsidy.use
Indonesia op.ip non-h.ip* non-h.op use.subsidy* use.subsidy* use.subsidy
Malaysia non-h.ip non-h.op use.subsidy* use.subsidy* n.a.
Nepal non-h.(ipþ op)a non-h.(ipþ op)a use.subsidy
Sri Lanka op.non-h use.subsidy use.subsidy n.a.
Thailand non-h.ip non-h.op* subsidy.use
Vietnam non-h.ip* non-h.op* subsidy.use*
ip is inpatient, op is outpatient, non-h is non hospital.
Blank cell indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that curves are indistinguishable using the multiple comparison test at the 5 percent
significance level.
. indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of dominance, for example, op . ip indicates that outpatient care is more propoor than
inpaticare and use . subsidy indicates that the use distribution is more propoor than the subsidy distribution.
*indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of nondominance in favor of an alternative strict dominance in the direction indicated by ., as above, using
the intersection–union test and a 5 percent significance level.
aTest is between all hospital care (inpatient and outpatient) and all nonhospital care.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data documented in table S.1 (see supplemental appendix S.1 available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.
org/).
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Younger (2000) but somewhat stronger, since the current study allows for
more sources of heterogeneity in unit subsidies.
Notwithstanding this result, there are significant differences between the
distributions of use and subsidy. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka the
use distributions dominate—they are more propoor than the subsidy
distributions—for all services, and in Gansu, Hong Kong SAR, and Nepal this
is true for some services (see table 3). Dominance is not always found using the
more conservative test, however. Urban–rural and regional differences in the
quality of care are the most likely reason that the subsidy is less propoor than
use. Only in India, Thailand, and Vietnam does the subsidy distribution domi-
nate the use distribution for certain services, indicating that the subsidy per
unit of care falls as household consumption rises. This is likely due to user
payments rising with household consumption, whether because of exemptions
granted to the poor or because richer households are paying for higher quality
care that is not reflected in the unit cost figures.
Cross-Country Comparisons
As would be expected from the results already presented, the subsidy concen-
tration curve of Hong Kong SAR dominates that of all other countries and
provinces (table 4).6 The incidence of public care is so skewed toward the poor
that the distribution of total healthcare (public and private) in Hong Kong
SAR is propoor (Leung, Tin, and O’Donnell 2005).7 While this is in striking
contrast with the distribution of healthcare in the low- and middle-income
countries examined in this article, it is consistent with the distribution that pre-
vails in most high-income economies (Van Doorslaer, Masseria, and Koolman
2006).
There are no significant differences between the concentration curves of
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, where the subsidies range from slightly
propoor to evenly distributed. On the less strict test the Vietnamese distri-
bution is dominated by that of Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, and Thailand and
it is indistinguishable from that of Sri Lanka. It dominates the subsidy distri-
butions of all the remaining countries and provinces using the less stringent
test.8 For most pairwise comparisons the subsidy concentration curves of
Bangladesh, Gansu, Heilongjing, India, Indonesia, and Nepal are indistinguish-
able. Exceptions are that India and Indonesia dominate Gansu and Nepal
using the less strict test. In all these countries and provinces the public health
subsidy is significantly and substantially prorich (see tables 1 and 2). This is
6. See table S-4 for cross-country dominance tests for each type of health service subsidy.
7. Some 43.5 percent of total expenditure on health in Hong Kong SAR is funded from private
sources (Hong Kong Domestic Health Accounts 1999–2000).
8. This is not due simply to the fact that unit subsidies are negatively correlated with household
consumption in Vietnam, unlike in most other countries and provinces. Only one cross-country
dominance result for Vietnam becomes insignificant when use of each service rather than the subsidy to
each service is examined.
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TA B L E 4. Cross-Country Dominance of Public Health Subsidy Concentration Curves
Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Vietnam Bangladesh Indonesia India Gansu Heilongjiang Nepal
Hong Kong SAR D* D* D* D D* D* D* D* D* D*
Malaysia n.s. n.s. D D D* D* D* D* D*
Thailand n.s. D D D* D* D D* D*
Sri Lanka n.s. ns D D D D* D*
Vietnam D D* D D* D D*
Bangladesh ns ns ns ns ns
Indonesia ns D ns D
India D ns D
Gansu, China ns ns
Heilongjiang, China ns
n.s. indicates failure to reject the null hypothesis that the curves are indistinguishable using the multiple comparison test at the 5 percent significance
level.
D indicates rejection of the null in favor of dominance (more propoor) of the row country over the column country by the same test.
*indicates that the intersection–union test rejects the null of nondominance against the alternative of strict dominance at the 5 percent significance
level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data documented in table S.1 (see supplemental appendix available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/).
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consistent with the findings of the majority of benefit incidence studies con-
ducted in developing countries (van de Walle 1995; Castro-Leal and others
2000; Mahal and others 2000; Sahn and Younger 2000; Filmer 2003). But
Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and to a lesser extent Vietnam stand out as
exceptions to this norm of prorich bias. Why is it that public healthcare is
more propoor in these four countries than it is in other developing countries of
Asia and elsewhere?
National income is an obvious candidate to explain cross-country variation
in the targeting of public health spending. Public healthcare is strongly targeted
to the poor in Hong Kong SAR in large part because Hong Kong is rich
enough to afford a dual system of universal public healthcare funded from
general taxation and a private healthcare system used predominantly by the
better-off to bypass the bottlenecks and inconveniences of the public system. It
is surely no coincidence that Malaysia and Thailand are the only other two
countries where public health spending is significantly propoor. While they are
not nearly as rich as Hong Kong SAR, they are considerably better off than the
other countries included in this study (see table S-5).
Economic development is not the sole explanation for cross-country differ-
ences in the incidence of public healthcare. It does not explain why Sri Lanka,
despite a lower GDP per capita than Indonesia, achieves a distribution of
health resources that is much more favorable to the poor. Levels of public
spending on health and health system characteristics might be expected to
explain part of the residual cross-country variation in targeting of the poor. In
per capita terms Sri Lanka spends 2.5 times as much as Indonesia on public
healthcare (table S-5). The scale of public spending may influence its incidence
by affording a wider geographic distribution of public health facilities and so
bring services closer to poor, rural populations.
There may also be a trickle-down effect. At low levels of spending the politi-
cally powerful, higher income urban elite may be more successful than the
rural poor in capturing spending for programs that meet their own needs. As
spending levels rise and more of the health needs of higher income groups are
satisfied, additional programs can be better targeted to the needs of the poor
(Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999). Countering this tendency, the pressure from
higher income groups for prioritization of tertiary-level city hospitals may be
maintained by the attraction of continuing advances in medical technology
(Victora and others 2000).
The extent to which higher income groups claim the benefits from public
healthcare will depend on whether an attractive private sector alternative
exists. Income-elastic demand for healthcare quality, in particular amenities
and convenience of service, will lead to greater substitution of private for
public care by an expanding middle-class as the economy grows. Hammer,
Nabi, and Cercone (1995) argue that this mechanism was largely responsible
for the increased propoor incidence of public health spending in Malaysia
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. The private sector continues to
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grow in Malaysia, driven in part by dissatisfaction with the responsiveness of
the public system (Shepard, Savedoff, and Phua 2002). In Thailand, which
has also achieved impressive economic growth in recent years, the private
sector is also expanding rapidly (Towse, Mills, and Tangcharoensathien
2004).
The combination of (near) universal public provision, a private sector
offering an attractive alternative, and incomes that make demand for this
alternative effective leads to redistribution through public provision in the
way that theory predicts (Besley and Coate 1991). This mechanism implies a
possibly uncomfortable tradeoff between the quality of public healthcare and
the extent to which it is targeted to the poor. In lower income countries,
such as Bangladesh, India, and Indonesia, separation of low- and high-
income groups into the public and private sectors is constrained not only by
the limited purchasing power of the middle class but also by marked intra-
sectoral quality differentials. There is evidence of pronounced income gradi-
ents in the quality of private sector care used in India (Das and Hammer
2005). There, as in Bangladesh, the poor make extensive use of unqualified
private providers.
This discussion suggests that economic development, the scale of public
health spending, and the availability and quality of private sector alternatives
may each help explain cross-country variation in the incidence of public health
spending. Regression analysis is used to examine whether this is the case across
the study countries and provinces and others for which benefit incidence results
are available from other studies (Filmer 2003). Only 24 observations are avail-
able for this analysis, and so the results (table 5) should be treated with due
caution. It is an exploratory exercise and not an empirical test of hypotheses.
The dependent variable is the (log) percentage of the total public subsidy
received by the poorest quintile. This share increases significantly with GDP
per capita, with an elasticity of about 0.3. At a lower level of significance (10
percent), the poorest quintile’s share is also increasing with public health
spending as a percentage of GDP, with an elasticity of about 0.5. So, for a
given GDP there is some evidence that the share of the subsidy going to the
poor is increasing with the scale of public health spending.
To examine whether, for a given level of public expenditure, the share of the
subsidy going to the poor increases with use of private sector alternatives,
public spending as a percentage of total expenditure on health is included in
the regression. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient is negative but
does not reach conventional levels of significance. The regression residuals are
largest, in absolute value, for the two Chinese provinces. Public health spend-
ing in these provinces is much less targeted on the poor than would be
expected given GDP and the scale of public spending and its share of total
health financing. This is most likely due to the extensive imposition of user
charges with no income-related exemptions. Excluding these two provinces
increases the magnitude and significance of the coefficients. In particular, the
106 T H E W O R L D B A N K E C O N O M I C R E V I E W
negative coefficient on the public health financing share becomes significant at
5 percent.9 Although this study has found that the public health subsidy is not
targeted on the poor in the majority of the 11 Asian countries and provinces
examined, the distribution appears to be even more skewed toward the better-
off in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa.10
TA B L E 5. Cross-Country Regression Analysis of Targeting of the Public
Health Subsidy (Dependent variable: log of percentage of public health subsidy
received by poorest quintile)
Full sample
Excluding Gansu and
Heilongjiang
Coefficient
Robust standard
errora Coefficient
Robust standard
errora
Log of gdp per capitab 0.3214*** 0.1002 0.3426*** 0.0889
Public health expenditure
as percent of gdp
0.2337* 0.1190 0.2971*** 0.0884
Public health expenditure
as percent of total health
expenditure
20.0080 0.0049 20.0110** 0.0043
Eastern Europe and
Central Asia
20.3308 0.2091 20.4895** 0.1889
Latin America and
Carribean
20.2478 0.3535 20.4338 0.2990
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.8630*** 0.3004 21.0750*** 0.2093
Constant 0.0691 0.7465 0.0294 0.7118
Sample size 24 22
R2 0.5712 p-value 0.7421 p-value
RESET (F3,n-k-3) 0.76 0.5371 0.71 0.5671
*Significant at the 10 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; ***significant at the 1
percent level.
Note: Observations are the 11 countries and provinces for the years of this study plus those
from Filmer (2003): Armenia (1999) Bangladesh (1995), Bulgaria (1995), Costa Rice (1992),
Cote d’Ivoire (1995), Ecuador (1998), Georgia (2000), Ghana (1994), Guinea (1994), Honduras
(1995), Nicaragua (1996), South Africa (1994), and Vietnam (1993).
aRobust to heteroscedasticity of general form.
bGross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity dollars at constant 2000
prices.
source: Dependent variable, authors’ calculations based on data in table S. 1 (see
supplemental appendix available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/) and that reported in Filmer
(2003). GDP, World Bank, various years, World Development Indicators. Health expenditure,
WHO, various years, National Health Accounts and World Health Report Statistical Annexes.
9. The results are similar if the weight given to observations with large absolute residuals is reduced,
but not set to zero, using robust regression. The results are also robust to the exclusion of Hong Kong
SAR, where the subsidy is much more propoor and GDP is much higher than in the other countries and
provinces.
10. Other potential explanatory factors, including the Gini coefficient, the urbanization rate, and
the doctor supply rate, were not found to be significant.
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These regression results tell only of associations in a fairly small sample of
countries and should not be interpreted as causal effects. GDP may be acting as
a proxy for a number of primary determinants of incidence, such as the quality
of governance and preferences for redistribution. Through human capital
acquisition, assuming that the marginal product of investments in health is
higher for poorer (and sicker) individuals, GDP may itself be responsive to the
targeting of healthcare to the poor. Polices are of course endogenous. The
positive correlation between the scale and the propoor incidence of public
spending may derive from the degree of political commitment to reaching the
poor. Reducing racial conflict in post-independence Malaysia was a major
motivation for the expansion in access to healthcare and the channeling of
public resources to the rural Malay population (Hammer, Nabi, and Cercone
1995). The early adoption of democracy and female suffrage in Sri Lanka
contributed to the high priority given to healthcare and the wide geographical
distribution of health resources in response to the lobbying of local politicians
(McNay, Keith, and Penrose 2004). In fact, a 1928 commission proposed
the full enfranchisement of women at the same time as men as a means of
securing a political lobby for the prioritization of healthcare (Rannan-Eliya
2001). High rates of female literacy and a relatively high degree of female
autonomy have raised awareness of maternal and child health problems,
leading to high rates of use of modern health facilities and medicines (Caldwell
1986).
Political and economic circumstances determine the motivation and
resources for the pursuit of propoor public healthcare, but realization of the
objective depends on the specific health sector policies adopted. One policy has
been to minimize charges for poor patients in accessing care. There are
virtually no fees for public health services in Sri Lanka, and fees are minimal in
both Hong Kong SAR and Malaysia (table S-6). In all three cases fees are
not retained by facilities or even by the health sector, but accrue to general
revenues, thus undermining providers’ incentives for generating fee revenue.
The near avoidance of user fees in resource-poor Sri Lanka has been feasible
only by driving down unit costs (Rannan-Eliya 2001). Nonmonetary
incentives, such as professional development and opportunities to work
simultaneously in the private sector, help maintain high levels of staff
productivity. In Thailand fees have been much higher. Prior to the introduction
of universal coverage in 2001, public hospitals received 20–50 percent of
their revenue from user fees (Towse, Mills, and Tangcharoensathien 2004).
But the disincentive effect on use by the poor was limited through a fairly
effective healthcard scheme that covered about two-thirds of the poor.
Crucially, this scheme compensated providers for fee exemptions from a
designated budget.
A geographically dispersed network of health facilities close to the rural
population also appears to contribute to the propoor targeting of health spend-
ing. In Malaysia half the population lives within 10 kilometers of a public
108 T H E W O R L D B A N K E C O N O M I C R E V I E W
hospital and within 4.6 kilometers of a public clinic.11 In Sri Lanka most of
the population has lived within 5 kilometers of a healthcare facility since the
early 1970s, and most of the rural population is within 5–10 kilometers of a
peripheral facility (Hsiao 2000). In Thailand, although beds and doctors are
highly concentrated in Bangkok, an extensive rural infrastructure has been
developed over decades. There are primary care health centers in all subdis-
tricts and community hospitals in all districts (Towse, Mills, and
Tangcharoensathien 2004). The introduction of universal coverage has initiated
a major shift of resources from urban hospitals to primary care. Vietnam also
has a relatively high level of provision in rural areas through a comprehensive
network of commune health centers.
But the contribution of primary care to propoor public health spending
should not be exaggerated. Public health spending is better targeted on the
poor in Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam because
the distribution of hospital care is more favorable to the poor and not because
more resources are devoted to nonhospital care (see table S-3). Of course, hos-
pitals differ. In Malaysia and Sri Lanka many hospitals are small in scale and
not particularly well equipped. But their wide geographic distribution makes
them accessible to the rural poor. In many other low-income countries, such as
Bangladesh, resources are more concentrated in large, well-equipped hospitals
in urban centers that are inaccessible to the poor.
I I I . C O N C L U S I O N
The analysis reveals substantial variation across Asia in the incidence of public
subsidies for healthcare. Public spending is strongly propoor in high-income
Hong Kong SAR. The total public health subsidy is more moderately propoor
in low- to middle-income Malaysia and Thailand and it is evenly distributed in
low-income Sri Lanka. At a still lower level of national income the subsidy is
mildly prorich in Vietnam. In the remainder of the low-income countries and
provinces examined, which account for the far greater share of the Asian popu-
lation, the better-off receive substantially more of the subsidy than do the
poor. In most cases there is prorich bias in the distribution of hospital care,
while nonhospital care is propoor. A greater share of the healthcare subsidy
goes to hospital care, and so this dominates the overall distribution. While
public health subsidies are typically not propoor, they are inequality reducing
in all cases except India and Nepal.
Most within- and between-country dominance tests are robust to whether
the distribution of healthcare use or the value of the subsidy is examined. This
is a reassuring result since the health accounts data required for analysis of
subsidy incidence are often unavailable and raw use data must be relied on.
There are, however, significant differences between the distribution of
11. Authors’ calculations from the 1996 National Health and Morbidity Survey.
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healthcare use and healthcare subsidies, with use often more propoor. Where
this occurs, the likely explanation is urban–rural and interregional differences
in the nature and funding of facilities.
The analysis shows that the prorich distribution of public healthcare subsi-
dies that is pervasive in most developing countries is avoidable but that effec-
tive targeting is easier to realize at higher levels of national incomes. The
experiences of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam suggest that achiev-
ing a more propoor incidence of public health spending requires limiting the
use of user fees, or at least effectively protecting the poor from them; building
a wide geographic network of health facilities; and ensuring that hospital care,
which absorbs most spending, is sufficiently targeted at the poor.
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TA B L E S1. Description of sample surveys
Country
Survey
year
Survey
name
Institution
conducting
survey
Survey
coverage Survey design
Sampling
unit
Response
rate
Sample size
individuals
Bangladesh 1999–
2000
Health and
Demographic
Survey (HDS)
2000
Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics
(BBS)
National Stratified Household and
Individual
99% 56,010
Gansu
(China)
2003 National Health
Household
Interview
Surveys
Ministry of Health Gansu province
(poor in
west China)
Stratified, cluster
sample. Self-
weighting
Household 100% 15,535
Heilongjiang
(China)
2003 Heilongjiang
Health
Household
Interview Survey
Health bureau of
Heilongjiang
province
Heilongjiang
province
(north-east
China)
Stratified, cluster
sample. Self-
weighting
Household 100% 11,572
Hong Kong
SAR
April–
June
2002
Thematic
Household
Survey in the
second quarter
of 2002
Census and
Statistics
Department,
Government of
Hong Kong
SAR
National Stratified.
Sample
weights
applied
Household
(noninstitutional;
individual
(institutional)
78.4%
(noninstitutional);
97.2%
(institutional)
31,672
India 1995–96 National Sample
Survey 52nd
round
National Sample
Survey
Organisation
National Stratified, cluster
sample.
Weights
applied
Household 100% 629,024
Indonesia 2001 Socioeconomic
Survey
(SUSENAS)
National Board of
Statistics
National Stratified, cluster
sampling. Self-
weighted
Household 98% 889,413
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TABLE S1. Continued
Country
Survey
year
Survey
name
Institution
conducting
survey
Survey
coverage Survey design
Sampling
unit
Response
rate
Sample size
individuals
Malaysia 1996 National Health
and Morbidity
Survey II
Public Health
Institute,
Ministry of
Health
National Stratified, cluster
sample.
Weights
applied
Household 86.90% 59,903
Nepal 1995/96 Nepal Living
Standards
Survey
Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS)
National Stratified, cluster
sample.
Weights
applied
Household 96.60% 18,855
Sri Lanka 1996/97 Consumer Finance
Survey
Central Bank Excluded
Northern
Province due
to civil war.
Stratified Household 98% 399,28
Thailand Jan–June
2002
Socioeconomic
Survey
National Statistical
Office
National Stratified Household 80% 17,489
Vietnam 1998 Living Standards
Survey
General Statistical
Office
National Stratified, cluster
sample.
Weights
applied
Household 70% 28,623
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TA B L E S2. Measures of healthcare utilisation
Hospital care
Doctor visits
Nonhospital care
Polyclinic/health
center Antenatal care CommentsInpatients outpatients
Bangladesh
Reference period last episode in previous 3 months last episode in previous 3 months 3months Care at satellite and community
clinics also included but not
child immunisation
Measurement unit Number of days Number of
visits
Number of
visits
Gansu and Heilongjiang (China)
Reference period 12months 2 weeks n.a. 2 weeks n.a. Data on hospital care only. Five
levels of hospital are
distinguished, the lowest of
which are equivalent to
polyclinics.
Measurement unit Number of days Number of
visits
Number of
visits
Hong Kong SAR
Reference period 12 months 30 days 30 days n.a. n.a. Hospital outpatient includes
visits to specialist and A&E.
Doctor visits is general
outpatient visits.
Measurement unit Number of days Number of
visits
Number of
visits
India
Reference period 12 months 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks
Measurement unit Number of days any visits any treatment period any visits
Indonesia
Reference period 12 months 1 month n.a. 1 month 1 month Puskesmas (inpatients and
outpatients) and
supplementary Puskesmas
(outpatients) included in
health centre/polyclinic.
Polindes and Posyandu in
antenatal care.
Measurement unit Number of days Number of
visits
n.a. Number of visits,
Number of days for
inpatient
Number of
visits
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TABLE S2. Continued
Hospital care
Doctor visits
Nonhospital care
Polyclinic/health
center Antenatal care CommentsInpatients outpatients
Malaysia
Reference period 12 months 2 weeks n.a. 2 weeks n.a.
Measurement unit Number of
admissions
Number of
visits
Number of visits
Nepal
Reference period 30 days n.a. 30 days n.a. Data does not allow distinction
between hospital IP and OPMeasurement unit Number of
visits
n.a. Number of visits n.a.
Sri Lanka
Reference period 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks n.a.
Measurement unit Any admission Any visit Any visit Any visit
Thailand
Reference period 12 months 1 month n.a. 1 month n.a. A distinction is made between
public and private care only
for the last 2 IP admissions
and the last episode of other
care. Assumed all care
received in same sector
Measurement unit Number of
admissions
Number of
visits
Number of visits
Vietnam
Reference period 12 months 4 weeks n.a. 4 weeks n.a. No distinction between public
and private sector for IP care.
Since vast majority of
hospitals were public,
assumed all IP is public
Measurement unit Number of days Number of
visits
Number of visits
IP inpatient.
OP outpatient.
n.a. not applicable.
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TA B L E S3. Summary indices of incidence of incidence of the public healthcare subsidy
Hospital care
Non-hospital care Total public subsidyInpatient Outpatient
Bangladesh
Concentration index 0.2325 (0.1154) 0.1356 (0.0360) 0.0474 (0.0838) 0.1588 (0.0609)
Kakwani index 20.1338 (0.0909) 20.2388 (0.0372) 20.3358 (0.0692) 20.2244 (0.0499)
Subsidy share 47.99% 25.33% 26.69% 100%
Gansu (China)
Concentration index 0.2442 (0.0509) 0.1199 (0.0373) 0.1199 (0.0373) 0.1970 (0.0365)
Kakwani index 20.2286 (0.0439) 20.3529 (0.0360) 20.3529 (0.0360) 20.2758 (0.0332)
Subsidy share 65.42% 34.58% 34.58% 100%
Heilongjiang (China)
Concentration index 0.03232 (0.0605) 0.2192 (0.0474) 0.2192 (0.0474) 0.2527 (0.0385)
Kakwani index 20.1242 (0.0652) 20.2281 (0.0510) 20.2281 (0.0510) 20.1946 (0.0424)
Subsidy share 60.09% 39.91% 39.91% 100%
Hong Kong SAR
Concentration index 20.3193 (0.0355) 20.2762 (0.0264) 20.2444 (0.0232) 20.3104 (0.300)
Kakwani index 20.6919 (0.0356) 20.6491 (0.0265) 20.6173 (0.0232) 20.6831 (0.0301)
Subsidy share 82.47% 13.36% 4.17% 100%
India
Concentration index 0.2630 (0.0193) 0.00296 (0.0211) 20.1325 (0.0328) 0.2117 (0.0164)
Kakwani index 0.0122 (0.01928) 20.2476 (0.02113) 20.3830 (0.03281) 20.0390 (0.0165)
Subsidy share 83.68% 9.62% 6.65% 100%
Indonesia
Concentration index 0.4896 (0.0254) 0.3891 (0.0186) 20.0078 (0.0045) 0.1822 (0.0081)
Kakwani index 0.1752 (0.0248) 0.0880 (0.0187) 20.3142 (0.0047 20.1245 (0.0080)
Subsidy share 26.54% 14.86% 58.59% 100%
Malaysia
Concentration index 20.0416 (0.0124) 20.0165 (0.0231) 20.2410 (0.0181) 20.0807 (0.0116)
Kakwani index 20.4100 (0.0131) 20.3863 (0.0235) 20.3863 (0.0235) 20.4493 (0.0123)
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TABLE S3. Continued
Hospital care
Non-hospital care Total public subsidyInpatient Outpatient
Subsidy share 37.02% 38.53% 24.45% 100%
Nepal
Concentration index 0.3422 (0.0709) 0.3422 (0.0709) 0.1865 (0.0411) 0.2541 (0.0398)
Kakwani index 0.1268 (0.0605) 0.1268 (0.0605) 20.0677 (0.0487) 0.0384 (0.405)
Subsidy share 54.58% 54.58% 45.24% 100%
Sri Lanka
Concentration index 0.0220 (0.0377) 20.0486 (0.0304) 20.0486 (0.0304) 20.0020 (0.0269)
Kakwani index 20.3313 (0.0252) 20.4042 (0.0172) 20.4042 (0.0172) 20.3561 (0.0284)
Subsidy share 68.00% 32.00% 32.00% 100%
Thailand
Concentration index 20.0242 (0.0308) 20.0392 (0.0227) 20.2506 (0.0325) 20.0404 (0.0195)
Kakwani index 20.4199 (0.0317) 20.4348 (0.0242) 20.6463 (0.0335) 20.4361 (0.0210)
Subsidy share 50.74% 45.16% 4.18% 100%
Vietnam
Concentration index 0.0354 (0.0359) 0.1672 (0.0349) 20.1065 (0.0272) 0.0114 (0.0283)
Kakwani index 20.1495 (0.0471) 20.0599 (0.0667) 20.4623 20.2573 (0.0458)
Subsidy share 86.88% 2.13% 10.98% 100%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data documented in table S-1.
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TA B L E S4. Cross-country Dominance of Public Health Subsidy Concentration Curves
Total subsidy Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Vietnam Bangladesh Indonesia Gansu India Heilongjiang Nepal
Hong Kong SAR D* D* D* D D* D* D* D* D* D*
Malaysia n.s. n.s. D D D* D* D* D* D*
Thailand n.s. D D D* D D* D* D*
Sri Lanka n.s. n.s. D D D* D* D*
Vietnam D D* D* D D D*
Bangladesh n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Indonesia D n.s. n.s. D
Gansu (China) n.s. n.s.
India D n.s. D
Heilongjiang (China) n.s.
Hospital inpatient subsidy Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Vietnam Bangladesh Gansu India Heilongjiang Nepal Indonesia
Hong Kong SAR D* D* D* D D D* D* D* D* D*
Malaysia n.s. n.s. D n.s. D* D* D* D* D*
Thailand n.s. D n.s. D D* D D* D*
Sri Lanka n.s. n.s. D D* D D* D*
Vietnam n.s. D D D D* D
Bangladesh n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Gansu (China) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
India n.s. D D*
Heilongjiang (China) n.s. n.s.
Nepala
Indonesia D
Hospital outpatient subsidy Sri Lanka Thailand Malaysia India Gansu Bangladesh Vietnam Heilongjiang Indonesia
Hong Kong SAR D* D* D D* D* D D* D* D*
Sri Lanka n.s. n.s. n.s. D D D* D D*
Thailand n.s. n.s. D D D D D*
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TABLE S4. Continued
Total subsidy Malaysia Thailand Sri Lanka Vietnam Bangladesh Indonesia Gansu India Heilongjiang Nepal
Malaysia n.s. D D D* D D*
India D D D* D D*
Gansu (China) n.s. n.s. n.s. D
Bangladesh n.s. n.s. D
Vietnam n.s. D
Heilongjiang (China) D
Non-hospital subsidy Hong Kong Malaysia India Vietnam Indonesia Bangladesh Nepal
Thailand D D D D D* D D*
Hong Kong SAR n.s. D D D* D* D*
Malaysia D D D D D*
India n.s. D* D D*
Vietnam D D D*
Indonesia n.s. D*
Bangladesh n.s.
Note: Countries/provinces are ranked from most to least propoor according to values of concentration indices.
Tests follow the multiple comparison approach with the null hypothesis defined as curves being indistinguishable. n.s. indicates failure to reject the
null at 5% significance.
D indicates that the subsidy concentration curve of the row country/province dominates (is more pro-poor) than that of the column country/province.
There are no cases of crossing concentration curves.
*indicates that the intersection union principle test rejects the (different) null of nondominance against the alternative of strict dominance at 5%. If
no *appears, then this test does not reject its null.
acomparison with Nepal are for the aggregate of inpatient and outpatient subsidies.
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TA B L E S5. National Income and Government Expenditure on Health
Territory Yeara
GDP per capita,
PPP $b
General government
expenditure on
health as % GDPc
General government
expenditure on health
per capital, PPP $
General government expenditure
on health as % total
expenditure on health
Bangladesh 1999 1495 0.98 15 27
China 2002 4568 2.26 103 42
Gansu (China) 2002 2661 2.38 63 42
Heilongjiang
(China)
2002 5434 1.48 80 36
Hong Kong
SAR
2001/02 26049 3.26 849 57
India 1996 1994 0.81 16 16
Indonesia 2001 3146 0.57 18 36
Malaysia 1996 8254 1.34 111 58
Nepal 1995/96 1179 1.20 14 24
Sri Lanka 1996/97 2951 1.63 48 50
Thailand 2000 6740 2.04 138 61
Vietnam 1998 1854 1.44 27 33
aYear of survey used for distributional analysis.
bGDP per capita in international $ using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Constant year 2000 prices.
cGeneral government expenditure on health including social insurance.
Source: GDP per capita—World Development Indicators, World Bank. Health expenditures—National health accounts estimates, except: India,
Malaysia and Vietnam from World Health Report, Stastistical Annexes, WHO, and Nepal from (HMG/Nepal 2000 and Hotchkiss, Rous and others
1998).
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TA B L E S6. Charges and exemptions for public healthcare
Charged services Free Services Income/poverty related fee waivers
Nonpoor groups exempt from
charges
Bangladesh Secondary services (nominal
registration fee for inpatient/
outpatient); Inpatient care in
major hospitals
Most primary care (or local
services); medicines within
facility; immunization; some
reproductive healthcare
Poor exempt or pay lower charge Civil servants (selected services)
China Inpatient (including etc
medicines); Outpatient
(including medicines);
Immunisation
Family planning None Old Red Army soldiers and
Retirees
Hong Kong
SAR
Inpatient (including medicines);
outpatient (including
medicines); dental
Accident and emergency (until
December 2002)
Welfare recipients exempt Civil servants and dependents
(reduced rate for Inpatients);
hospital staff and dependents
India Inpatient bed charge;
outpatient registration
charge; certain medicines;
tests/x-rays; dental
Hospital consultation and certain
medicines. Primary care/health
center/polyclinic consultation
and medicines. Family planning.
Vaccinations and immunizations
None formally. Indirect relation to
income through price
differentiation in inpatient care.
Informally, “poor” can be
exempted partially or fully from
charges
Civil sevants
Indonesia All medical care and medicines None Poor exempt from all charges.
Indirect relation of inpatient
charges to income through price
discrimination
Charges determined at local
government level. Some better
off local govts. Provide free
health centre care
Malaysia Hospital inpatient and
outpatient. Primary care.
Dental care. Diagnostics and
x-rays
Family planning and vaccinations/
immunizations. Outpatient ante
and postnatal care. Treatment of
infectious diseases on third class
wards. Dental care for pregnant
women and pre school children
Hospital directors have discretion
to waive fees for destitute.
Upper limit on charges for third
class ward patients
Infants less than 1 year
(outpatient). State rulers,
Governors and families. Civil
servants (including retired)
and dependents. Local
authority employees and
dependents
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Nepal All medical care and medicines.
Nominal charge for
outpatient varying with
facility.
Emergency services; selected
vaccines, immunization and
reproductive health services.
60% subsidy for medicines at
Health Posts and Primary Care
centres.
Poor either exempt or pay reduced
charge but not fully
implemented.
None
Sri Lanka Family planning services.
Patients occasionally asked
to buy medicines/supplies
from private retailers when
out of stock at facility.
All medical and medicines except
family planning.
No official exemptions, but limited
survey evidence suggests that
facility staff tend to avoid asking
the poorest patients to self-
purchase medicines and supplies,
or ration available stocks to
them.
None
Thailand All medical care and medicines.
After Oct 2001, fixed fee (30
Baht) UC scheme means very
minimal co-payment.
Nonpersonal healthcare; EPI
vaccination
Poor exempted from user fees and
co-payments. Informally, those
“unable to pay” are exempted.
children ,12; elderly .60;
public health volunteers;
monks.
Vietnam Fees for most services
introduced in 1989.
Medicines rarely provided
free of charge.
Outpatient services at commune
health centres.
Fee exemptions for individuals
who have certification of
indigency from neighbourhood
or village People’s Committee.
Families of health personnel,
certain classes of patients (like
handicapped, TB), orphans.
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